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Abstract:  
 
Purpose 
– The purpose of this paper is to use the socio‐emotional wealth perspective to examine how the 
level of family involvement reduces the propensity to use incentives to non‐family managers in 
small to medium‐sized enterprises (SME) family firms. Design/methodology/approach – 
Primary data were collected from US firms. To evaluate the hypotheses, a logit model was 
employed on a final sample of 2,019 small family firms. 
 
Findings 
– Results suggest that family influence and control and intra‐family transgenerational succession 
intentions are negatively related to the propensity to use incentives. Also, the interaction effects 
of family management and ownership reduce the propensity to use incentives. 
 
Originality/value 
– The paper’s empirical findings imply that despite their potential economic benefits, family 
involvement reduces the probability that incentives will be offered to non‐family managers 
because such incentives are perceived to be inconsistent with the preservation of the family’s 
socioemotional wealth. Also, choices that reflect a preference for socioemotional wealth may not 
only be a function of decision framing and loss aversion but also by the size of the economic 
pay‐offs that might be available. The findings suggest that non‐family managers in SME family 
firms may be affected by a family’s preoccupation with its socioemotional endowments. Thus, 
the authors expect that this paper provides further avenues to explore the decisions about 
attaining non‐economic and economic goals and other strategic issues in family firms. 
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Article: 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the family and business interface (Litz, 2008), an important issue faced by many small‐ and 
medium‐size privately held family firms (hereafter SME family firms) is the limited ability to 
compete in the market for managerial labor and provide competitive compensation (Block, 
2011; Carney, 2005; Ensley et al., 2007). Indeed, incentive compensation decisions are critical in 
all organizations since they influence how individuals behave (Baker et al., 1988). Gibbons and 
Murphy (1992) show that to maximize managerial effort, compensation contracts should be 
designed to optimize total incentives (i.e. the combination of the implicit incentives from career 
opportunities and explicit incentives from the compensation contract). 
 
Incentive compensation packages that are beyond regular wages tend to include profit sharing, 
bonuses, and company stock options (Baker et al., 1988). Non‐family firms (publicly traded 
and/or privately held) utilize incentive compensation when managerial retention is a concern, 
owing to the criticality of the manager's expertise, and the ease of managerial mobility (Dutta, 
2003). In the case of SME family firms, the level of family involvement may have distinctive 
consequences for the implementation of these schemes for managers (family or non‐family 
related). For example, because of the pursuit of non‐economic goals designed to create and 
preserve socioemotional wealth, SME family firms are often reluctant to offer stock options to 
non‐family managers (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007, 2011; McConaughy, 
2000)[1]. Unfortunately, although recent studies have addressed intra‐firm determinants of 
managerial compensation in family firms (e.g. Block, 2011; Ensley et al., 2007), our knowledge 
about the incentive compensation paid to non‐family managers in SME family firms is largely 
limited to conceptual treatises (e.g. Chrisman et al., 2014;Chua et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2003). 
 
Building from a socioemotional wealth perspective, our paper focusses on testing how the level 
of family involvement reduces the propensity to use incentives to non‐family managers in SME 
family firms. We focus on SME family firms because they tend to experience substantial trade‐
offs in their preferences for economic and non‐economic goals and this influences their decisions 
on whether to use incentive compensation. In addition, the family's ownership and control are 
key elements of their socioemotional wealth and also allow the family the power to pursue its 
agenda throughout the firm (Zellweger et al., 2012). Although socioemotional wealth concerns 
tend to dominate decision making, family firms can be expected to attempt to maximize their 
utility from achieving both economic and non‐economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2003c, 2014), 
whereas non‐family firms will primarily focus on achieving only economic goals. As a 
consequence, it is expected that the SME family firm will compensate non‐family managers less 
for two reasons. First, those managers are unlikely to be entirely willing or able to contribute to 
the achievement of non‐economic goals and preservation of socioemotional wealth. Second, 
offering higher levels of compensation to non‐family managers negatively affects the overall 
utility of family owners since such compensation reduces their ability, dollar for dollar, to 
provide altruistic‐inducted benefits to family managers. 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on the study of 2,019 SME family firms. Our findings are 
consistent with the extant research suggesting that the values and aspirations of the family 
business owner(s) and/or manager(s) (e.g. Chrisman et al., 2003b) and their intentions for 
transgenerational succession (Ward, 1997; Habbershon and Williams, 1999; James, 
1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003;Zahra et al., 2008) play a key role in formulation and 
implementation of strategies, including managerial compensation decisions. 
 
We contribute to the family firm literature by providing further insights into the family and 
business interface. Our empirical findings imply that despite their potential economic benefits, 
family ownership, management, and intra‐family succession expectations reduce the probability 
that incentives will be offered to non‐family managers because such incentives are perceived to 
be inconsistent with the preservation of the family's socioemotional wealth. This is an important 
theoretical contribution because unlike diversification and R&D (Chrisman and Patel, 
2012; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2010), incentive compensation schemes need only be paid when 
warranted by performance and therefore have low to no downside economic risk for the firm. 
Thus, we suggest that choices that reflect a preference for socioemotional wealth may not only 
be a function of decision framing and loss aversion as implied by previous research (e.g. Gomez‐
Mejia et al., 2007, 2010) but also by the size of the economic pay‐offs that might be available. 
Apparently, even relatively certain economic benefits are discounted if the possibility of a loss of 
socioemotional wealth is present. Consequently, our theoretical arguments and findings confirm 
previous research and theory and draw attention to new avenues for future work on the non‐
economic and economic goals that underlying decisions regarding managerial compensation and 
other strategic issues in family firms. 
 
We proceed in the following manner. First, we outline the theoretical model and hypotheses. 
Second, we present our methodology, empirical model, and results. Third, we conclude with our 
research directions for theory and practice. 
 
2. Goal pursuance in SME family vs non-family firms 
 
Firm decisions are driven by the goals of owners and managers, which sometimes come into 
conflict. Incentive compensation is intended to align the interests of owners and managers and 
thereby reduce or eliminate goal conflict as well as improve firm performance. However, 
because SME family firms seek economic and non‐economic goals while non‐family firms are 
driven primarily by economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2003c); the value of incentive 
compensation may vary. For example, Chrisman et al.(2014) suggest that family‐centered goals 
lower the willingness and ability of SME family firms to provide competitive compensation to 
non‐family managers even when those managers behave as stewards rather than agents. 
 
Similarly, it has been argued that family firms are a unique organizational form because the 
attainment of family‐centered goals leads to the creation of socioemotional wealth involving, the 
preservation of family values, harmony, social capital, reputation, and the ability to behave 
altruistically toward family members (Chrisman et al., 2012; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 
2007; Pearson et al., 2008).Berrone et al. (2012, p. 259) recently proposed that socioemotional 
wealth encompasses five dimensions that can be summarized by the acronym of “FIBER (Family 
control and influence, Identification of family members with the firm, Binding social ties, 
Emotional attachment of family members, and Renewal of family bonds to the firm through 
dynastic succession).” Although these dimensions resemble the main characteristics of family 
involvement in the business (e.g. Chrisman et al., 2005), family owners’ ability to maximize 
their utility through the firm will depend upon how the interactions between the business and the 
family are managed. 
 
SME family firms often face a dilemma between offering compensation packages to non‐family 
managers that are comparable to those offered to family managers (Barnett and Kellermanns, 
2006) and their pursuit of family‐centered non‐economic goals, which oblige them to provide 
altruistically induced benefits to family managers but not others (Chrisman et al., forthcoming). 
Family owners must thus consider whether the possibility of improving the performance of the 
firm by offering incentives to non‐family managers is worth the potential loss of socioemotional 
wealth (Chua et al., 2009). Research has shown that family owners are loss averse with regard to 
their socioemotional wealth (Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2011). This implies that when performance is 
at or above aspiration levels, family owners are risk averse toward opportunities to improve 
economic performance if there is a possibility of reducing socioemotional wealth, yet 
socioemotional wealth will sometimes be sacrificed when financial performance is below the 
aspiration levels of family owners (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2010). As a 
result, family firms are concerned with the trade‐offs between economic and non‐economic goals 
when making risky choices among alternatives. However, incentives per se are not risky in a 
similar sense because the costs of the incentives are contingent upon results; therefore, economic 
performance must rise before incentives are paid, suggesting that the decision is less about risk 
than about the utility attached to more certain economic and non‐economic pay‐offs. 
 
In sum, efforts to hire and retain a non‐family manager may have non‐economic costs to SME 
family firms that decrease the socioemotional wealth of the family controlling the business. 
However, providing incentives to attract, retaining, and align the interests of qualified non‐
family managers is desirable for improving firm growth, professionalizing management practices 
(Klein and Bell, 2007; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003), avoid inertia (Ensley, 2006; Lester and Cannella, 
2006; Mitchell et al., 2003; Schulze et al., 2002;Zahra et al., 2004), grow their knowledge base 
(Block, 2011), prevent managerial entrenchment (Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2001), and relax the 
constraints to growth when there are not enough family members who are capable to manage the 
firm (Chua et al., 2009;De Massis et al., 2008; Dunn, 1995). Again, unlike investments in R&D 
and diversification, the economic risks of providing incentives to non‐family managers in the 
firm are minimal, meaning that such decisions are based more on the marginal utility of the 
options to family owners rather than loss or risk aversion. 
 
2.1 Hypotheses 
 
Following the arguments of Litz (2008) and recent suggestions from the socioemotional wealth 
perspective (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012), we develop hypotheses about the impact of family 
ownership, management, and transgenerational succession intentions on the propensity to use 
incentives for non‐family managers. We base our arguments on the notion that the decisions of 
family owners and managers will tend to consider both the pay‐offs as well as the risks of their 
actions and will therefore weigh the trade‐offs between economic and non‐economic benefits. 
However, we also argue that their decisions but will generally exhibit a preference for the 
preservation socioemotional wealth. In that regard, Chrisman et al. (2005) suggest that the 
family's ability to act in its own interests is given by its level of control and influence – the first 
of Berrone et al. (2012) FIBER dimensions – over the firm through ownership and management 
whereas its willingness to act idiosyncratically is influenced by its succession intentions – the 
last of Berrone et al. (2012) FIBER dimensions. 
 
2.1.1 Family ownership and management 
 
Family ownership is significant “when a family owns all or a controlling portion of the business 
and plays an active role in setting strategy and in operating the business on a day‐to‐day basis” 
(Kelly et al., 2000, p. 27). Both family owners and managers are prone to consider how their 
decisions will affect socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012). Hence, ownership and 
management can be important in determining strategic choices on a business such as providing 
incentives to non‐family managers. 
 
Family ownership allows family members to have control rights over the use of a firm's assets 
and use these rights to instill a vision and dominate decision making in family firms (Carney, 
2005; Zahra, 2003). When decision making is centralized among top family members, the ability 
and willingness to make idiosyncratic decisions increase, while the cost of making and 
implementing decisions decreases (Habbershon and Williams, 1999; Naldi et al., 2007; Zahra et 
al., 2008). In addition, ownership gives the family the discretion power for the timely generation 
and implementation of strategic ideas (Zahra, 2005; Zellweger et al., 2012). Hence, decisions 
related to compensating managers (family and non‐family) will be shaped by the family 
owner(s)'s primary desires or wishes. 
 
Family owners may wish to pursue family‐centered non‐economic goals even at the expense of 
economic goals in order to maximize family firm utility and preserve socioemotional wealth. 
When family welfare is closely tied to the family firm's welfare (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), the 
propensity to hold non‐economic goals increases as family ownership in the business increases 
(Chrisman et al., 2012). Such behavior provides room for lavish rewards for family managers, 
but it reduces the desirability of offering similar rewards to non‐family managers. Indeed, the 
benefits of achieving non‐economic goals are not transferable to non‐family managers and 
indeed those managers may be largely unaware of the nature of the family's non‐economic goals. 
Since non‐family managers are unlikely to be able or willing to add to the family's 
socioemotional wealth, there is little motivation for family owners to set up incentive 
compensation schemes for them (Chrisman et al., 2014). Thus, when the proportion of family 
ownership is at higher levels, the likelihood for offering additional compensation packages to 
non‐family managers will be reduced. 
 
Aside from family ownership, the influence of the family increases when governance and 
management responsibilities are given to family members. Particularly, in SME family firms, 
strategic decisions involving employment and compensation of non‐family managers are shaped 
by the values and aspirations of family owners and managers and the level of professionalized 
management may be low or inexistent (e.g. Carney, 2005; Chua et al., 2009). Indeed, when 
family managers have the power and the legitimacy to dominate decision making, the probability 
that non‐family managers will be given incentive compensation decreases because these 
packages may empower non‐family managers and consequently decrease the family's discretion 
to act unilaterally and idiosyncratically. For example, if job creation for family members is a 
primary non‐economic goal (Chrisman et al., 2003a), policies that shift the criteria for promotion 
and/or compensation to competence rather than kinship ties, as is the usual and preferred 
situation, could threaten socioemotional wealth (Dyer, 2006; Perrow, 1972). Furthermore, the 
absence of willingness to retain non‐family manager(s) in the long run (cf. Lee et al., 2003) may 
reduce the likelihood they will be provided incentive compensation. 
 
Furthermore, the compensation of family managers may set an upper limit on the compensation 
paid to non‐family managers even if the latter displays greater ability and the higher paid family 
manager does not expend sufficient additional effort in return for the “altruism‐induced extra 
pay” received (Chua et al., 2009, p. 363). On one side, the viability of the firm and the 
socioemotional wealth of the family may be strengthened when family managers sacrifice their 
economic well‐being by receiving lower compensation because of affective commitment to the 
firm and higher levels of job security compared to non‐family managers (Combs et al., 
2010;Cruz et al., 2010; Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2011). The willingness of family managers to accept 
lower pay owing to the “family handcuff,” altruism, and current or future ownership provide the 
family firm with survivability capital (Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2011; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). 
Offering non‐family managers incentive compensation might upset this delicate balance. 
Furthermore, in comparison to the abilities of family managers which, owing to their life‐long 
relationships with family owners are well‐understood, it will be difficult for family firms to 
gauge the extent to which non‐family managers will be able to contribute to firm value. Finally, 
since providing incentive compensation to non‐family managers may reduce socioemotional 
wealth, the utility associated with the improvement of economic performance will need to be 
higher in order to offset that loss. However, family firm‐specific idiosyncrasies, which make it 
more difficult for non‐family managers to effectively apply their experience to the family firms, 
will limit the possibility of this occurring (Chrisman et al., 2014). 
 
In sum, when considering the effects of family influence and control in terms of ownership and 
management, it may be expected that preserving the socioemotional wealth of the SME family 
firm will decrease the likelihood of offering incentive compensation to non‐family managers. 
Thus: 
 
H1a. Family ownership is negatively associated with the propensity to use non‐family managers’ 
incentive compensation in family firms. 
 
H1b. Family management is negatively associated with the propensity to use non‐family 
managers’ incentive compensation in family firms. 
 
2.2.2 Intra‐family succession intentions 
 
Chua et al. (2004) suggest that most family firms start with a high degree of family involvement 
and an emphasis on intra‐family transgenerational succession. Berrone et al. (2012) suggest that 
succession expectations inside the family renew the commitment of the family to the business 
and this is a key dimension for determining the level of socioemotional wealth. 
Family firms with succession expectations tend to be more long‐term oriented in business 
activities (Ward, 1997; Habbershon and Williams, 1999; James, 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Zellweger, 2007) and more concerned with the achievement of non‐economic goals 
(Chrisman et al., 2012). The longer time horizon is rooted in the primary desire for the family's 
continuity, stability, unity, and legacy (Upton et al., 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Miller and 
Le Breton‐Miller, 2006), which can facilitate the maximization of the family's economic and 
non‐economic goals for the firm and lower the value of hiring and retaining non‐family 
managers, which consequently impacts the willingness to provide them with incentive 
compensation. 
 
Furthermore, since family firm leaders wish to pass on a sustainable legacy to subsequent 
generations (Dyer and Whetten, 2006), they tend to exhibit careful resource conservation and 
allocation (Carney, 2005), which may lead to parsimony in determining non‐family managers’ 
compensation. According to Miller and Le Breton‐Miller (2005a, b), nurturing the business to 
support future generations can even result in family business members’ accepting lower 
dividends and pay, which extends the financial sacrifice to include both family and non‐family 
managers. Even though incentives packages such as stock options can be used to align interests 
and transfer risk between owners and managers (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Ross, 2004) and 
increase managerial productivity (Baker et al., 1988; Dutta, 2003); those decisions may conflict 
with the expectation that the next business leader will come from the family because they can 
reduce family control. In other words, decisions about the alignment of interests between owners 
and managers are more about developing commitment among the next generation of family 
members than providing non‐family managers with stock options or other incentives. 
 
Moreover, the primary focus on promoting and retaining family business members owing to the 
intentions to transfer the business to the next generation can result in relatively higher 
dependence on family members than on non‐family managers, particularly when there are family 
members who are able and willing to take over the business (Block, 2011; Sharma et al., 2003). 
When this occurs, the motivation to retain non‐family managers in the long run is reduced, which 
makes providing incentive compensation of lower value. Indeed, family firms with intra‐family 
succession plans may be preoccupied with grooming and preparing the potential successor(s), 
rather than concerns about non‐family managers (Handler, 1994; Mitchell et al., 2003). Hence, 
intentions for transgenerational succession are expected to result in lower incentive 
compensation of non‐family managers: 
 
H2. Intra‐family succession intentions are negatively associated with the propensity to use non‐
family managers’ incentive compensation in family firms. 
 
3. Methods  
 
For testing our hypotheses, we needed to find a sizable sample of SME family firms. As family 
firms are heterogeneous (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Melin and Nordqvist, 
2007), it is not easy to obtain primary data that could cover and address the methodological 
requirements outlined by prior researchers (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012). In that regard, we collected 
cross‐sectional data from a survey conducted by the Small Business Development Center 
(SBDC) Program in the USA in 2005. Since the SBDC conducts programs in each state, serving 
large numbers of small and new firms each year, it is a useful source of data for studying small 
family firms in the US questionnaires were sent twice by mail to the entire population of 30,416 
operating businesses that received counseling assistance from an SBDC in 2003. A total of 4,950 
firms responded (16.3 percent). 
 
As our unit of analysis is the SME family firm, we limited our analysis to those firms with five 
or more employees, and with at least one of the following: family ownership, family managers, 
and succession intentions as prior research have used these variables to classify family firms 
(e.g. Chua et al., 1999, 2004). By applying these restrictions, along with missing data, the final 
sample size was reduced to 2,019 firms that ranged from low to high levels of family 
involvement. In order to test for potential non‐response bias, responses were divided into early 
and late respondents based on the time they returned the questionnaire. There were no 
statistically significant differences between the responses to the first and second mailings on the 
variables of interest to this study. Since relative to early respondents late respondents are likely 
to be more similar to non‐respondents (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975;Oppenheim, 1966), the tests 
suggest that non‐response bias is not a significant concern in this study. Furthermore, subsequent 
analysis of the data and the results indicated that neither common method variance (Podsakoff 
and Organ, 1986) nor multicollinearity was a problem. 
 
3.1 Dependent variable 
 
Respondents were asked if they provide non‐family managers compensation packages that 
include bonus, profit sharing, and/or ownership stakes in the business. We created a categorical 
variable: propensity to use incentives to non‐family managers where values of 1 were given if the 
firm offers bonuses, profit sharing, or both to compensate non‐family managers while values of 0 
were given if the firm does not offer such incentives to non‐family managers. Research has 
indicated that family firms rarely offer ownership shares or stock options to non‐family members 
(McConaughy, 2000) so it is reasonable to exclude this form of incentive compensation. Indeed, 
<5 percent of the firms in the sample offered stock options to non‐family managers. The 
dependent variable has a mean of 0.38 (SD=0.49) which indicates that over one‐third of the firms 
in the sample offer incentive compensation to non‐family managers in addition to their salaries. 
 
3.2 Independent variables 
 
Family influence and control were measured by the proportion of family ownership in the firm 
and by the proportion of family managers over the total management team of the firm. In the 
sample, 91 percent of the firms are majority owned by family members and 72 percent of the 
managers are family members. 
 
Intra‐family transgenerational succession intentions is a categorical variable where values of 1 
were given when respondents expressed intentions for transgenerational succession and values of 
0 were given if they did not. In the sample, 52 percent of the respondents have intentions for 
transgenerational succession. 
 
3.3 Control variables 
 
We controlled for industry, firm's age, firm size, and perceived performance owing to their 
possible influence on the managerial compensation of non‐family managers. Three categorical 
variables are used to account for firms in retail, service, and manufacturing industries. In the 
sample, 20 percent of the firms are in retailing, 50 percent are in services, and 16 percent are in 
manufacturing with the remainder operating in other industries. Firm age was measured by the 
number of years the firms had been in business. The average firm age is about 13 years. Firm 
size is measured by the number of employees in a firm. The average firm size is about 11 
employees. Perceived performance is a self‐reported subjective measure where respondents were 
asked to compare, on a five‐point Likert‐type scale, their profitability (return on sales) relative to 
their expectations over a three‐year period. Research indicates that subjective and objective 
performance data are correlated (Dess and Robinson, 1984). Furthermore, these measures of 
performance have been successfully utilized in prior family firm research (e.g. Eddleston and 
Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 2008). 
 
3.4 Empirical model 
 
To test our hypotheses, we develop a logit model of the relationship between the propensity to 
use incentive compensation to non‐family managers and family involvement. Thus, the model 
implies that:  
 
 
 
where Yi=1 if family firms use incentives such as bonus, profit sharing, or both to compensate 
non‐family managers and otherwise Yi=0. Xik represent a set of control variables, such as 
industry, firm age, and firm size, Rij is the vector of independent variables (family ownership, 
family management, and intra‐family transgenerational succession), and εi is random error term 
in this model. 
 
4. Results 
 
Table I provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables used in the 
study. Table II presents the results of six logit regression models. We used the χ2‐statistic to 
indicate the overall explanatory power and found that all six of the logit models were significant 
at the 0.001 level. 
 
Table I Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
 
Table II Results of logit model 
 
 
 
Model 1 regresses the control variables against the dependent variable. The pseudo R2 is 0.02. 
Firm age is negatively related and firm size positively related to incentive compensation, testing 
at the 0.05 level. Model 2 is used to test H1a as the family ownership variable is added to the 
model. The pseudo R2 increases to 0.14. Firm age continues to be significant. More importantly, 
family ownership is negatively related to the dependent variable at the 0.001 level. Thus, H1a is 
supported. Model 3 is used to test H1b as the family management variable is added to the model. 
The pseudo R2 increases to 0.15. The firm age variable is once again negative and significant. 
Supporting H1b, family management is negatively related to the dependent variable at the 0.001 
level. Model 4 adds the transgenerational succession intentions variable to test H2. The 
pseudo R2 increases to 0.07 with firm age negatively related and firm size positively related to 
the dependent variable. H2 is also supported by the significant, negative relationship between 
succession intentions and the incentive compensation variable (p<0.001). 
 
Models 5 and 6 provide further support for our theory and hypotheses. Model 5 includes the 
three independent variables together. The pseudo R2 is 0.11. H1b and H2 are supported as family 
management and succession intentions are negative and significant (p<0.001) but H1a is not 
supported as family ownership is not significant. In addition, it is important to notice that 
perceived performance is positive and significant and in this model firm age and size are also 
positive and significant (p<0.001). Due to the results of Model 5, we included Model 6 where the 
interaction effect of family management and ownership is added to the model. The 
pseudo R2 increases to 0.13 as the interaction is significant (p<0.05) and family management 
becomes marginally significant (p<0.10). 
 
This finding suggests that the combined effects of family influence via ownership and 
management tends to decrease the propensity to offer incentives to non‐family managers. It also 
helps explain the discrepancy in the findings of Models 2 and 5 with regard to H1a. Thus, 
although family ownership provides the power to determine whether incentive compensation is 
offered to non‐family managers or not, the lack of family managers eliminates one of the major 
obstacles to doing so since there are no or fewer non‐economic considerations that make such 
decisions unattractive. In other words, without family managers the threat to the socioemotional 
wealth of family owners of providing incentive compensation to non‐family managers is greatly 
diminished, allowing them to focus on the potential economic benefits of a stronger alignment of 
their interests with those of non‐family managers. 
 
4.1 Robustness tests 
 
To provide additional support for our findings, we conducted several robustness tests by 
exploring other specifications in the dependent variable. First, we reran the analysis using only 
the presence or absence of profit sharing packages to compensate non‐family managers as the 
dependent variable. The results were very similar to the Model 5. Second, we next considered the 
results of using bonuses as the dependent variable. In this case the results were consistent but 
even stronger than those presented in the Model 5; family ownership was negative and 
significant (p<0.05) to attain further support for H1a. Third, we converted the binomial 
dependent variable into a multinomial dependent variable ranging from 0 to 2 depending upon if 
the firm offered no incentives (0), bonus or profit sharing (1), or both bonus and profit sharing 
(2). Multi‐nominal and ordinary least square regressions again confirmed the findings discussed 
above. 
 
In sum, our findings provide empirical support that as family ownership, management, and 
intentions for transgenerational succession intentions increase, SME family firms are less likely 
to offer incentive compensation to non‐family managers. The results therefore provide further 
evidence to support the notion of that preserving socioemotional wealth may be a priority for 
firms showing higher levels of family influence and control as well as intentions for intra‐family 
succession. Our results suggest as family domination increases, employment in a family firm can 
become less attractive managers with no kinship ties to the family. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Our study advances the family business literature by exploring the relationship between family 
involvement and the use of incentive compensation for non‐family managers in SME family 
firms. Drawing upon and extending the socioemotional wealth perspective, we suggest that 
family ownership, management, and intra‐family succession intentions will be negatively 
associated with the propensity to compensate non‐family managers. Even though offering 
compensation incentives to managers (family and non‐family) might lead to higher firm 
performance and is low risk because incentive payouts are only given if performance increases, 
the economic benefits are usually not valued as highly as the potential loss of socioemotional 
wealth that might ensue. 
Our findings support the contention that two dimensions of socioemotional wealth, family 
influence and control and intra‐family transgenerational succession intentions, are negatively 
related to the propensity to use incentives such as bonus and profit sharing to compensate non‐
family managers. It is interesting to note that the significant interaction effect of family 
ownership and management implies that family ownership without management involvement 
may shift the relative importance of economic and non‐economic goals away from the latter and 
toward the former. Thus, while ownership may be enough for defining a firm as a family firm, it 
may not be enough to prompt family members to sacrifice economic performance for non‐
economic benefits because without family managers there is no one to provide altruistic benefits 
and, potentially no one in the family to run the firm (Schulze and Gedajlovic, 2010; Chrisman et 
al., 2012). In such situations, the family may be more likely to treat the firm as an economic 
instrument rather than a family institution. 
 
Our study contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, this paper extends the 
socioemotional wealth perspective by considering the trade‐offs between economic and non‐
economic goals in situations where downside economic risk is low or absent. This theoretical 
perspective suggests that the size of the pay‐offs from the pursuit of economic goals must be 
weighed against the socioemotional wealth at risk. In other words, our study allows for the 
possibility that aversion to loss of socioemotional wealth may be limited by the amount of 
economic rewards available. Our results indicate, however, that disproportionate gains are likely 
to be necessary to cause family owners to forego socioemotional wealth in the pursuit of 
economic wealth. Particularly, our study shows that family ownership, management, and 
succession intentions attenuate the use of incentive compensation for non‐family managers even 
though such compensation does not need to be paid unless the firm's economic performance 
improves. 
 
Second, our focus on non‐family managers in SME family firms implies that stakeholders 
outside the family may be affected by a family's preoccupation with its socioemotional 
endowments. Thus, non‐family managers may not be given the opportunities to advance either 
professionally or financially that they might otherwise have if the firm pursued more traditional, 
economic goals. This may also result in unbalanced or negative perceptions of organizational 
justice (Barnett and Kellermanns, 2006) that can isolate a non‐family manager from behaving as 
a contributor to the business or even as a follower of the family vision. Likewise, the constraints 
in growth and profitability that might result can have serious repercussions on economic 
development at the societal level, especially given the dominant role of family firms around the 
world. Consequently, although concerns for socioemotional wealth can have positive 
ramifications for stakeholders outside the family firm (Berrone et al., 2010), the possibility of 
negative impacts needs equal treatment. 
 
5.1 Limitations 
 
Our study has several limitations. First, our sample includes firms that are relatively small and 
new so they may not be able to exploit the full benefits of employing non‐family managers 
owing to their scope of operations. Although our unit of analysis properly states the study of 
small‐ and medium‐sized firms, the results cannot be generalized to family firms who may be 
older or larger. Hence, future studies should explore non‐family managers’ compensation in 
larger family firms. In addition, when considering older firms, it may be possible to determine 
how the succession process has affected the compensation of non‐family and family managers. 
Furthermore, older and/or larger family firms may also rely on outsider support (e.g. independent 
or external board members, advisory boards, or family business consultants) in making 
compensation decisions. In that regard, it may be possible that families will be influenced by 
outsiders to offer compensation packages to managers regardless of kinship ties. Second, the data 
collection was cross‐sectional in nature and we cannot determine causality from our 
observations. Thus, we encourage future studies to utilize longitudinal research designs. Third, 
although our analysis suggested that common method bias was not a problem (Podsakoff and 
Organ, 1986), multiple sources of objective and perceptual data would improve the design of 
future studies. Fourth, data limitations required that transgenerational succession intentions be 
measured as a categorical variable. Future research would benefit if a multi‐item scale for 
operationalizing this variable was developed. 
 
5.2 Future research directions 
 
In addition to addressing the limitations of this study, there are several other avenues for future 
research that should be considered. Aside from the determinants of non‐family managers’ 
compensation in family firms that we have pointed out in this paper, there may be other 
determinants that affect these decisions in family firms, such as the family firm's degree of 
professionalization (Chua et al., 2009; Dyer, 1988). We expect that family firms may be more 
willing to hire and offer higher incentive compensation to non‐family managers as the degree of 
professionalization increases. In addition, studies can also seek to investigate the feedback loop 
that goes from the business to the family subsystem to continue the exploration of Litz 
(2008) model. Particularly, it is needed to empirically test the fairness perceptions of the non‐
family managers and employees toward the HR practices employed by the family (e.g. Barnett 
and Kellermanns, 2006). 
 
Studies can also examine the impact of incentive compensation paid to non‐family managers’ on 
firm performance or on the preservation of socioemotional wealth. While our results suggest that 
there is a positive association between perceived performance and the propensity to use 
incentives for non‐family managers, future studies may need to examine the reverse relationship. 
Studies that complement those conducted with family managers (e.g. Chrisman et al., 2007) to 
inquire about the benefits of hiring, retaining, and compensating non‐family managers are also 
needed. Indeed, many family firms continue to operate in the long run not because they are 
highly profitable, but because the firm serves the attainment of non‐economic goals of the family 
(Gomez‐Mejia et al., 2007). 
 
Another future research avenue can be the investigation of the relationship between the 
composition and compensation of the management teams in family firms. Some family firms 
may prefer to reflect a professional family firm image and make effort to hire and retain non‐
family managers. It would therefore be interesting to examine how these family firms build a 
positive image and reputation for professional human resources management practices. Future 
research might also investigate whether incentive compensation for non‐family managers’ varies 
depending upon the life‐cycle stages, culture, and strategic orientation of family firms 
(Gersick et al., 1997) or the potential moderating effects that may exist when the family firm has 
other governance structures (e.g. board of directors, advisory boards, etc.). On one hand, a family 
firm with a growth orientation may exhibit a higher propensity to offer incentive compensation 
to non‐family managers as it needs expertise and know‐how from outside the family to position 
the firm in the industry. On the other hand, non‐family managers can also be needed when family 
firms are competing in mature or declining industries and additional entrepreneurial efforts are 
needed to navigate in the market. Finally, future investigation may also consider the potential 
non‐linear effects that family involvement exerts over compensating non‐family managers. 
Future researchers may want to expand our framework at both the conceptual and empirical level 
to complement our findings in the study. 
 
5.3 Practical implications 
 
A primary implication of this study is that family owners and managers are apt to let their 
concerns for socioemotional wealth influence their decisions on whether to provide incentive 
compensation to non‐family managers. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, but the 
decision should be consciously made because it can have important affects on the firm. Thus, 
family owners and managers need to take a careful look at their economic and non‐economic 
goals and attempt to understand the trade‐offs among them. While non‐economic goals are 
important, they can often come into conflict with the attainment of economic goals and their 
relative utility can depend upon which goal is threatened, a situation that is likely to change over 
time. Understanding these trade‐offs will assist in determining whether to offer incentive 
compensation to non‐family managers. Without an understanding of their priorities, family 
owners and managers are likely to make decisions on the compensation the non‐family managers 
arbitrarily. 
 
Family owners and managers also need to understand that non‐family managers may be driven 
by a different set of goals and ignoring their needs is not the answer. Although some non‐family 
managers may behave as stewards rather than agents, the best among them will still gravitate 
toward firms with goals and strategies that they believe are compatible with their own. 
Importantly, non‐family managers are less likely to understand the non‐economic goals of family 
members, which may vary substantially. Furthermore, the training of non‐family managers 
makes them better suited to assist in obtaining the firm's economic goals. Therefore, it is 
necessary to communicate the family's non‐economic goals for the firm to non‐family managers, 
explain how that affects the way the business is operated, and ensure that efforts to accomplish 
those goals are rewarded appropriately and consistently. The ability to do so will assist in both 
the alignment and achievement of the interests of family and non‐family members alike. 
 
In conclusion, we hope our results will motivate practitioners and family business consultants to 
guide family leaders to develop compensation packages that can meet the expectations of non‐
family managers and lead to their retention in the family firm. Otherwise, valuable human 
resources can be lost or even become potential competitors to the current family firm if those 
non‐family managers leave the organization. Making wise decisions toward compensating non‐
family managers is important to maintain the level of competitiveness of the family firm in the 
long run. 
 
References 
 
Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M. (2003), “Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
evidence from the S&P 500”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 58 No. 3, pp. 1301-1328.  
 
Baker, G.P., Jensen, M.C. and Murphy, K.J. (1988), “Compensation and incentives: practice vs 
theory”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 593-616.  
 
Barnett, T. and Kellermanns, F.W. (2006), “Are we family and are we treated as family? Non-
family employees’ perceptions of justice in the family firm”, Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, Vol. 30 No. 6, pp. 837-854.  
 
Berrone, P., Cruz, C. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (2012), “Socioemotional wealth in family firms 
theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research”, Family 
Business Review, Vol. 25 No. 3, pp. 258-279.  
 
Berrone, P., Gomez-Mejia, L.R. and Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010), “Socioemotional wealth and 
organizational response to institutional pressures: do family controlled firms pollute 
less?”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 55 No. 1, pp. 82-113.  
 
Block, J.H. (2011), “How to pay non-family managers in large family firms: a principal – agent 
model”, Family Business Review, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 9-27. 
 
Carney, M. (2005), “Corporate governance and competitive advantage in family-controlled 
firms”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 29 No. 3, pp. 249-265.  
 
Chrisman, J.J. and Patel, P.C. (2012), “Variations in R&D investments of family and non-family 
firms: behavioral agency and myopic loss aversion perspectives”, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 55 No. 4, pp. 976-997.  
 
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. and Litz, R. (2003a), “A unified systems perspective of family firm 
performance: an extension and integration”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 18 No. 
4, pp. 467-472.  
 
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. and Sharma, P. (2005), “Trends and directions in the development of a 
strategic management theory of the family firm”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
Vol. 29 No. 5, pp. 555-575.  
 
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. and Steier, L.P. (2003b), “An introduction to theories of family 
business”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 441-448.  
 
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. and Zahra, S.A. (2003c), “Creating wealth in family firms through 
managing resources: comments and extensions”, Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 
Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 359-365.  
 
Chrisman, J.J., Memili, E. and Misra, K. (2014), “Non-family managers, family firms, and the 
winner’s curse: the influence of non-economic goals and bounded rationality”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 38 No. 5.  
 
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., Kellermanns, F.W. and Chang, E.P.C. (2007), “Are family managers 
agents or stewards? An exploratory in privately held family firms”, Journal of Business 
Research, Vol. 60 No. 10, pp. 1030-1038.  
 
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., Pearson, A.W. and Barnett, T. (2012), “Family involvement, family 
influence, and family-centered non-economic goals in small firms”, Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 267-293.  
 
Chua, J.H., Chrisman, J.J. and Bergiel, E.B. (2009), “An agency theoretic analysis of the 
professionalized family firm”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 33 No. 2, pp. 
355-372.  
 
Chua, J.H., Chrisman, J.J. and Chang, E.P.C. (2004), “Are family firms born or made? An 
exploratory investigation”, Family Business Review, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 37-54.  
 
Chua, J.H., Chrisman, J.J. and Sharma, P. (1999), “Defining the family business behavior”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 19-39.  
 
Combs, J.G., Penney, C.R., Crook, T.R. and Short, J.C. (2010), “The impact of family 
representation on CEO compensation”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 34 
No. 6, pp. 1125-1144.  
 
Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L.R. and Becerra, M. (2010), “Perceptions of benevolence and the 
design of agency contracts: CEO-TMT relationships in family firms”, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 53 No. 1, pp. 69-89.  
 
De Massis, A., Chua, J.H. and Chrisman, J.J. (2008), “Factors preventing intra-family 
succession”, Family Business Review, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 183-199.  
 
Dess, G.G. and Robinson, R.B. (1984), “Measuring organizational performance in the absence of 
objective measures: the case of the privately-held firm and conglomerate business unit”, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 265-273.  
 
Dunn, B. (1995), “Success themes in Scottish family enterprises: philosophies and practices 
through the generations”, Family Business Review, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 17-28.  
 
Dutta, S. (2003), “Capital budgeting and managerial compensation: incentive and retention 
effects”, Accounting Review, Vol. 78 No. 1, pp. 71-93.  
 
Dyer, W.G. (1988), “Culture and continuity in family firms”, Family Business Review, Vol. 1 
No. 1, pp. 37-50. 
 
Dyer, W.G. (2006), “Examining the ‘family effect’ on firm performance”, Family Business 
Review, Vol. 19 No. 4, pp. 253-273.  
 
Dyer, G. and Whetten, D.A. (2006), “Family firms and social responsibility: preliminary 
evidence from the S&P 500”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 30 No. 6, pp. 
785-802.  
 
Eddleston, K. and Kellermanns, F.W. (2007), “Destructive and productive family relationships: a 
stewardship theory perspective”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 545-
565.  
 
Eddleston, K., Kellermanns, F.W. and Sarathy, R. (2008), “Resource configuration in family 
firms: linking resources, strategic planning and environmental dynamism to 
performance”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 45 No. 1, pp. 26-50. 
 
 Ensley, M. (2006), “Family businesses can out-compete: as long as they are willing to question 
the chosen path”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 30 No. 6, pp. 747-754. E 
 
nsley, M.D., Pearson, A.W. and Sardeshmukh, S.R. (2007), “The negative consequences of pay 
dispersion in family and non-family top management teams: an exploratory analysis of 
new venture, high-growth firms”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 60 No. 10, pp. 
1039-1047.  
 
Gersick, K.E., Davis, J.A., Hampton, M.M. and Lansberg, I. (1997), Generation to Generation: 
Life Cycles of the Family Business, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.  
 
Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K.J. (1992), “Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career 
concerns: theory and evidence”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100 No. 3, pp. 468-
505.  
 
Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Makri, M. and Kintana, M.L. (2010), “Diversification decisions in family 
controlled firms”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 223-252.  
 
Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Nunez-Nickel, M. and Gutierrez, I. (2001), “The role of family ties in 
agency contracts”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 44 No. 1, pp. 81-95.  
 
Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P. and De Castro, J. (2011), “The bind that ties: 
socioemotional wealth preservation in family firms”, Academy of Management Annals, 
Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 653-707.  
 
Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Haynes, K.T., Nunez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K.J.L. and Moyano-Fuentes, J. 
(2007), “Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: evidence 
from Spanish olive oil mills”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 52 No. 1, pp. 106-
137.  
 
Habbershon, T.G. and Williams, M. (1999), “A resource-based framework for assessing the 
strategic advantage of family firms”, Family Business Review, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 1-25.  
 
Handler, W.C. (1994), “Succession in family business: a review of the research”, Family 
Business Review, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 133-157. James, H.S. (1999), “Owner as manager, 
extended horizons and the family firm”, International Journal of the Economics of 
Business, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 41-55.  
 
Kanuk, L. and Berenson, C. (1975), “Mail surveys and response rate: a literature review”, 
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 440-453.  
 
Kelly, L.M., Athanassiou, N. and Crittenden, W.F. (2000), “Founder centrality and strategic 
behavior in the family-owned firm”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 25 No. 
2, pp. 27-42.  
 
Klein, S.B. and Bell, F.A. (2007), “Non-family executives in family businesses: a literature 
review”, Electronic Journal of Family Business Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 19-37.  
 
Lee, K.S., Lim, G.H. and Lim, W.S. (2003), “Family business succession, appropriation risk and 
choice of successor”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 657-666. 
 
Lester, R.H. and Cannella, A.A. (2006), “Interorganizational familiness: how family firms use 
interlocking directorates to build community-level social capital”, Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, Vol. 30 No. 6, pp. 755-775.  
 
Litz, R.A. (2008), “Two sides of a one-sided phenomenon: conceptualizing the family business 
and business family as a Mobius strip”, Family Business Review, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 217-
236.  
 
McConaughy, D.L. (2000), “Family CEOs vs non-family CEOs in the family-controlled firm: an 
examination of the level and sensitivity of pay to performance”, Family Business Review, 
Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 121-131.  
 
Melin, L. and Nordqvist, M. (2007), “The reflexive dynamics of institutionalization: the case of 
the family business”, Strategic Organization, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 321-333.  
 
Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005a), Managing for the Long Run: Lessons on 
Competitive Advantage from Great Family Businesses, Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, MA.  
 
Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005b), “Management insights from great and struggling 
family businesses”, Long Range Planning, Vol. 38 No. 6, pp. 517-530.  
 
Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006), “Priorities, practices and strategies in successful and 
failing family businesses: an elaboration and test of the configuration perspective”, 
Strategic Organization, Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 379-407.  
 
Mitchell, R.K., Morse, E.A. and Sharma, P. (2003), “The transacting cognition of non-family 
employees in the family business setting”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 18 No. 4, 
pp. 533-551.  
 
Naldi, L., Nordqvist, M., Sjoberg, K. and Wiklund, J. (2007), “Entrepreneurial orientation, risk 
taking, and performance in family firms”, Family Business Review, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 
33-47.  
 
Nalebuff, B.J. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1983), “Prizes and incentives: towards a general theory of 
compensation and competition”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 21-43. 
Oppenheim, A.N. (1966), Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement, Free Press, 
New York, NY.  
 
Pearson, A.W., Carr, J.C. and Shaw, J. (2008), “Toward a theory of familiness: a social capital 
perspective”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 32 No. 6, pp. 949-969.  
 
Perrow, C. (1972), Complex Organizations, Scott, Foresman, and Company, Glenview, IL. 
Podsakoff,  
 
P.M. and Organ, D.W. (1986), “Self-reports in organizational research: problems and 
perspectives”, Journal of Management, Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 531-544.  
 
Ross, S.A. (2004), “Compensation, incentives, and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness”, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 59 No. 1, pp. 207-225.  
 
Schulze, W.S. and Gedajlovic, E.R. (2010), “Whither family business?”, Journal of Management 
Studies, Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 191-204.  
 
Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. and Dino, R.N. (2002), “Altruism, agency, and the 
competitiveness of family firms”, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 23 Nos 4-5, 
pp. 247-259.  
 
Sharma, P., Chrisman, J.J. and Chua, J.H. (2003), “Predictors of satisfaction with the succession 
process in family firms”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 18 No. 5, pp. 667-687.  
 
Sirmon, D.G. and Hitt, M.A. (2003), “Managing resources: linking unique resources, 
management and wealth creation in family firms”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 339-358.  
 
Upton, N., Teal, E.J. and Felan, J.T. (2001), “Strategic and business planning practices of fast 
growth family firms”, Journal of Small Business Management, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 60-72.  
 
Ward, J.L. (1997), “Growing the family business: special challenges and best practices”, Family 
Business Review, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 323-337.  
 
Zahra, S.A. (2003), “International expansion of US manufacturing family businesses: the effect 
of ownership and involvement”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 495-
512. 
 
Zahra, S.A. (2005), “Entrepreneurial risk taking in family firms”, Family Business Review, Vol. 
18 No. 1, pp. 23-40.  
 
Zahra, S.A., Hayton, J.C. and Salvato, C. (2004), “Entrepreneurship in family versus non-family 
firms: a resource-based analysis of the effects of organizational culture”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 363-381.  
 
Zahra, S.A., Hayton, J.C., Neubaum, D.O., Dibrell, C. and Craig, J. (2008), “Culture of family 
commitment and strategic flexibility: the moderating effect of stewardship”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 32 No. 6, pp. 1035-1054.  
 
Zellweger, T. (2007), “Time horizon, costs of equity capital, and generic investment strategies of 
firms”, Family Business Review, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 1-15.  
 
Zellweger, T., Kellermanns, F.W., Chrisman, J.J. and Chua, J.H. (2012), “Family control and 
family firm valuation by family CEOs: the importance of intentions for transgenerational 
control”, Organization Science, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 851-868. 
 
Further reading  
 
Deloitte & Touche (1999), Are Canadian Family Businesses an Endangered Species? The First 
Success Readiness Survey of Canadian Family-Owned Business, Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu and University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON.  
 
Corresponding author  
 
Esra Memili can be contacted at: e_memili@uncg.edu  
